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Executive Summary
Ethiopia, the second most populous country in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, is home to about 75 million 
people. The country has a tropical monsoon 
climate characterized by wide topographic-induced 
variations. With rainfall highly erratic, Ethiopia is 
usually at a high risk for droughts as well as 
intraseasonal dry spells. The majority of the 
population depends on agriculture as the primary 
source of livelihood, and the sector is dominated 
by smallholder agriculture. These small farmers rely 
on traditional technologies and produce primarily 
for consumption.
Famine vulnerability is high in Ethiopia. With the 
rapid population growth of the past two decades, 
per capita food grain production has declined. 
Cereals constitute the largest share of food 
production in the country. Today, with recurrent 
famine threats, food aid is an important source of 
cereal supply.
Additionally, agricultural market dysfunctions are 
common in Ethiopia. Throughout history, the state 
has controlled the markets. With the enactment of 
a major market reform in the 1990s, the country 
saw some progress. Markets remain thin, however, 
with wide price spreads and volatility.
In 2002, despite good harvests in the previous 
years, Ethiopia was hit by another famine: 
Production was insufficient, and food did not flow 
from surplus to deficit areas. Apart from 
population pressure, the causes of this crisis 
include production, market, policy, institutional, 
and organizational failures.
Each time a food crisis occurs, there is a complex 
interaction of supply, distribution, and demand 
factors. It is these processes at work on national 
and household levels that determine outcomes for 
food security, food availability, access, and use.
Because the causes of famine are multifaceted, 
multiple actions are required to prevent its 
occurrence. On a broader level, two points must be 
emphasized. First, specific programs alone cannot 
effectively tackle famine. Micro-level interventions 
should be considered in tandem with
macroeconomic policies. Second, market 
integration and price stabilization must be in place 
for individual projects to function effectively. The 
question of policy and program choice and 
sequencing arise in determining the optimal 
program mix for mitigating and preventing famine. 
But how is such a program mix determined under 
resource and time constraints?
Your assignment is to recommend a set of short- 
and long-term policies and programs to improve 
food security in Ethiopia that will be compatible 
with available government resources and reductions 
of Ethiopia's dependence on foreign food aid.
Background
Geography
Ethiopia, the second most populous country in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, is home to about 75 million 
people. Located in the northeastern part of the 
Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is landlocked and shares 
boundaries with Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, 
and Sudan. The country has a tropical monsoon 
climate characterized by wide topographic-induced 
variations. With rainfall highly erratic, Ethiopia is 
usually at a high risk of annual droughts as well as 
intraseasonal dry spells [FAO 2005; World Bank 
2007; CIA 2007],
Economy
A s one of the poorest countries in the world, 
Ethiopia has a per capita gross domestic product 
[GDP] of US$160—no more than a fifth of the 
Sub-Saharan African average. The majority of the 
population lives in the rural areas and depends on 
agriculture as their primary source of livelihood. 
The sector accounts for almost 47 percent of GDP, 
60 percent of exports, and 80 percent of 
employment. The main agricultural products 
include cereals, pulses, oilseeds, coffee, potatoes, 
sugarcane, cut flowers, fish, and livestock. Coffee is 
the main export commodity, with total exports of 
about US$350 million in 2006. The agricultural 
sector is dominated by smallholder agriculture. 
Most small farmers rely on traditional technologies
and produce primarily for consumption [Kuma 
2002; Gabre-Madhin and Mezgebou 2006; World 
Bank 2007; CIA 2007],
Famine in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a history of famine1 *: Between 1983 and 
1985, the country experienced the worst famine in 
current history, with a series of rain failures and 
substantial livestock loss. About 8 million 
Ethiopians were affected, and 1 million were 
estimated to have died. The famine also had longer- 
term effects in that many of the poor had depleted 
their assets to deal with the famine, which left them 
even more vulnerable to future crises. Famine 
vulnerability continued through the mid-1990s 
owing to conflict in the northern regions and 
protracted drought in other regions of the country 
(Webb and von Braun 1994],
In 2002 Ethiopia was hit by another famine, despite 
good harvests in 2000/2001 and 2001/2002. 
Grain prices fell below the historic average. Maize 
prices in surplus regions fell by almost 80 percent. 
Although reduced prices favored the rural and 
urban poor, it created a disincentive for input use 
by producers. By late 2002 the increase in 
production and the lower prices were not sufficient 
to combat the chronic food insecurity that affected 
the majority of poor households; the number of 
people in dire need of food had more than doubled 
(Kuma 2002; Gabre-Madhin 2003],
About 6 million people were in need of urgent 
food aid, and 15 million faced the threat of 
starvation. Unable to supply adequate food to keep 
people alive, the Government of Ethiopia reached 
out to the international community for assistance. 
In the words of Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles 
Zenawi, "Even if we had the food available in the 
domestic market, the government doesn't have the 
money to buy this surplus food for redistribution" 
(BBC 2002], In January 2003 there was an actual 
decline of 21 percent in production and a 27 
percent decrease in seed and fertilizer use, leading
1 According to Webb and von Braun (1994], "Famine is a
catastrophic disruption of society as manifested in a 
cumulative failure of production, distribution, and 
consumption systems" (p. 11]. It is the exact opposite of 
food security, which can be defined as "access by all 
people at all times to the food required for them to lead 
a healthy and productive life" (p. 12].
to an 85 percent price increase compared with 
2002 (Gabre-Madhin 2003],
Food Grain Production Trends
With the rapid population growth of the past two 
decades, per capita food grain production has 
declined. Cereals constitute the largest share (about 
88 percent] of crop production in Ethiopia. Five 
major food grains— teff, maize, sorghum, wheat, 
and barley—make up 95 percent of total 
production. With limited irrigation use, food grain 
production is almost entirely dependent on rainfall. 
Production is characterized by extreme variability in 
area cultivated and volume of output. In the past 
decade, although certain areas of the country 
experienced significant gains in yield, the country 
overall has experienced limited gains in crop yields. 
Owing to the dependency on rain-fed agriculture, 
yield variability is highest for wheat, sorghum, and 
maize (Gabre-Madhin 2001; Kuma 2002; Gabre- 
Madhin and Mezgebou 2006; Rashid et al. 2006],
Food Aid Trends
Food aid is an important source of cereal supply in 
Ethiopia: Between 1995 and 2004, cereals accounted 
for 95 percent of food aid flows. About 74 percent 
was food aid imported from donor countries, 
whereas local purchases accounted for 
approximately 19 percent. Seventy-eight percent of 
total food aid inflows entered during emergencies. 
The influx of food aid has attracted much criticism 
because it may create disincentive effects on local 
production in the form of declining producer 
prices and government incentives to invest in 
productivity-enhancing technology and policy 
reforms. Although food aid is controversial, many 
studies have found no evidence of disincentive 
effects on local production and prices in Ethiopia 
(del Ninno et al. 2007],
Agricultural Markets and Politics in 
Ethiopia
Throughout history, Ethiopian governments have 
been heavily involved in agricultural markets. In the 
mid-1950s the government controlled international 
trade through state-owned enterprises (SOEs] and 
discouraged the acquisition of property rights 
through extensive state ownership of land. The 
Dergue regime in the mid-1970s prohibited private
ownership of landholdings of more than 10 
hectares, eliminated rural wage labor, and set 
production quotas and prices. The government 
controlled grain trade through an SOE, the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation [AMC]. The 
AMC set official prices below producer costs, 
thereby generating producer losses. Producers were 
required to deliver a fixed quota of grains for 
military and urban consumption. Private sector 
trade was barred in major producing regions, and 
traders in other regions had to supply 50-100 
percent of grain turnovers to the AMC at prices 
below the market level. The AMC also administered 
food ration shops [Gabre-Madhin 2001; Rashid et 
al. 2006],
In 1990, under pressure from the international 
donor community, Ethiopia enacted a radical and 
sudden market reform. Restrictions on private 
interregional trade, officially fixed prices, 
compulsory delivery quotas, and grain rationing 
were abolished. The AMC, renamed the Ethiopian 
Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), was transformed 
into a buffer stock scheme. In 1991, at the demise of 
the Dergue regime, the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia took office with the goal of replacing the 
centrally planned economy with a market-oriented 
economic system. In 1995 the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
government came into power. The EPRDF favored a 
liberal approach, devalued the Ethiopian currency, 
and implemented various phases of the structural 
adjustment program2 as well as other measures 
necessary for macroeconomic stability. The 
government also committed to improving the 
performance of the agricultural sector and ensuring 
food security [Gabre-Madhin 2001; Kuma 2002; 
Rashid et al. 2006).
The withdrawal of state control from agricultural 
markets in the 1990s was a boost to crop 
production. Prices increased in surplus markets and 
decreased in deficit markets. Consequently, there 
was a reduction in price spreads—that is, the price 
differences between surplus and deficit areas’—’but
2 Structural adjustment programs are economic policies 
for developing countries that have been promoted by 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
since the early 1980s through the provision of loans 
conditional on the adoption of such policies (W HO  
2007).
the volatility of price spreads remained high.3 In 
1999 more reforms were undertaken with the 
merger between EGTE and the Ethiopian Oil Seeds 
and Pulses Export Corporation (EOPEC). The new 
parastatal had the main objective of exporting 
grains for commercial profitability rather than 
stabilizing grain prices. No government unit has 
been assigned the role of stabilizing market prices 
(Gabre-Madhin 2001; Gabre-Madhin and 
Mezgebou 2006).
Policy Issues
Each time a food crisis occurs, there is a complex 
interaction of supply, distribution, and demand 
factors. It is these processes at work on national 
and household levels that determine outcomes for 
food security, food availability, access, and use. 
Although production and market failures are 
recognized as root causes of famine, policy, 
institutional, and organizational failures also play 
important roles (Webb et al. 1992; Webb and von 
Braun 1994; von Braun et al. 1998). Figure 1 is a 
summary of the interactions in famines.
Despite the major market liberalization in Ethiopia 
and food surpluses in recent years, food availability 
remains at low levels and food insecurity persists. 
Markets remain thin, with high price spreads and 
volatility. Why was plenty not enough? What 
happened to the 2002 surplus? Why is the flow of 
food from surplus to deficit areas limited? Why are 
prices still volatile? These questions raise a number 
of issues, including that of market dysfunction in 
agriculture.
3 Although favorable weather can explain the shift in 
price levels, it cannot explain the concurrent price 
increases in surplus areas and decreases in deficit areas. 
Other reasons suggested for the decrease in price 
spreads include lower transaction costs, the end of civil 
war and trade disruption in the northern regions, the 
termination of the activities of the former monopoly, 
and the fact that traders did not have to sell at below- 
market prices (Gabre-Madhin 2001).
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Production Failures: Water and Land 
Management
Agriculture is the main water-consuming sector in 
Ethiopia. Despite the country's endowment of water 
resources, the notable potential of Ethiopia's 
surface water remains untapped. Although the 
Government of Ethiopia [GOE] has not been 
proactive about the development and protection of 
large wetlands, external initiatives have emerged. 
Based on water and land availability, technology, 
and finance, Ethiopia's irrigation potential is 
estimated at approximately 2.7 million hectares. As 
of 2001, only 11 percent of this potential had been 
exploited. Current irrigation projects are 
categorized as traditional, modern small-scale, 
modern private, and public.4 An assessment of 
small-scale irrigation projects revealed that some 
projects operated below full potential whereas 
others were nonfunctional. Reasons include water 
shortage, damaged structures, and poor water 
management [FAO 2005],
Ethiopian highlands suffer from degradation, a 
major threat to current and future food 
production. Soil erosion by rainwater is one of the 
main causes. Other causes include physical, 
socioeconomic, and political factors and poor land 
policies. On average, soil erosion causes soil loss of 
about 42 tons per hectare per year on arable lands 
and an annual reduction of 4 millimeters in soil 
depth. Soil infertility due to erosion has adversely 
affected agricultural productivity. By 2010, with the 
current pace of soil removal and loss, soil erosion 
is expected to reduce per capita income in the 
highlands by approximately 30 percent. Although 
the GOE and international donors have recognized 
the threat of rapid land degradation, previous soil 
and water conservation efforts have not been very
4 Traditional irrigation projects vary from 1 to 100 
hectares. The projects are constructed through self-help 
programs with farmers' own initiative. M odem  small-scale 
irrigation projects are constructed by the government 
and nongovernmental organizations. Projects make use of 
technologies for irrigating up to 200  hectares. M odern 
private irrigation projects re-emerged when the market- 
based economic policy was adopted. By 2000  private 
investors had developed 5,500 hectares of irrigated 
farms. Public irrigation projects consist of medium [2 0 0 - 
3,000 ha] and large-scale [greater than 3,000 ha] 
irrigation projects. These projects are owned, 
constructed, and managed by public enterprises [FAO  
2005],
successful [Bewket and Sterk 2002; Aklilu and de 
Graaff 2006],
Farmlands in the highlands are small. According to 
a national study, the average farm size is about one 
hectare. As specified by the Ethiopian Constitution, 
the government remains the only landowner, and 
local governments are required to adhere to this 
statute in the design of land reforms. Thus, the 
GOE holds land tenure rights, and land sales and 
mortgages are outlawed. Nevertheless, the growing 
land rental market is a notable outcome of the 
recent land reforms implemented by local 
governments. Land transfer between users is often 
informal and nontransparent. As such, the land 
lease market lacks clear rules and regulations that 
ensure transparency and security of land
transactions, and farmers lack confidence in the 
ability of government agencies to enforce contracts 
[Negatu 2005; Pender et al. 2006],
Market Failures
The segmented and uncompetitive nature of 
Ethiopian agricultural output markets leads to high 
fluctuations in grain prices. Small farmers, unable to 
store grain because of low storage capacity, receive 
very low prices. And although storage capacity 
increased after the market reforms, storage facilities 
remain scarce, and the private sector does not have 
access to the limited facilities available in the 
country. Consequently, 79 percent of grain sales 
occur during the primary harvest season [January- 
March] owing to farmers' fear of storage loss and 
urgent need for cash. Loan repayment is the major 
reason farmers need to sell at low prices [Gabre- 
Madhin 2001; Gebreselassie 2006],
In terms of infrastructure, the country has one of 
the lowest road densities in the world. Road 
transport, which is the only means used to move 
grain, is dominated by the Ethiopian Freight 
Transport Corporation. Transaction costs are high 
owing to a lack of truck capacity to meet peak 
demand, lack of private competition, high operating 
costs, poor roads, and low capacity utilization. 
Additionally, the majority of rural people do not 
have access to modern transport, which is a major 
constraint to their ability to reach grain markets in 
the major production zones [Gabre-Madhin 2001],
Access to market information also remains 
restricted. Even in nearby markets, farmers have 
limited information on current prices. Likewise,
grain traders with limited access depend on brokers 
and transporters for market information. The 
Ethiopian grain market chain is fairly short—that is, 
little value is added along the chain and handling 
costs are high owing to the lack of quality control 
measures. Other reasons for the short market 
chain include the lack of specialization of 
wholesalers and low levels of commercial 
processing. The market structure has improved 
since the market reforms, but there is still 
significant capacity to increase market scale and 
sophistication [Gabre-Madhin 2001],
Policy. Institutional, and Organizational 
Failures
Modern technology use is extremely low, 
particularly in smallholder agriculture. Between 
2000 and 2001, only 5.4 percent of total cereal 
farmland was grown using improved seeds. High 
prices and farmer preferences for local seeds saved 
from the previous harvest constrain demand. 
Organic and chemical fertilizer use is limited to 
about 38 percent of the total cultivated area. In 
2000 around 14 percent of total cereal farmland 
was cultivated with the use of fertilizer. Tillage 
practices are also obsolete. Conventional tillage 
tools are inefficient and lead to prolonged periods 
of land preparation. Crop yields are both low and 
highly variable. Between 1995 and 2002, total crop 
yield grew by only 0.2 percent [Demeke 1999; 
Negatu 2005; Gebreselassie 2006],
Ethiopia's extension system—the Participatory 
Demonstration and Extension Training System 
[PADETS]—faces many problems in supplying and 
promoting better technologies. PADETS provides 
input credit packages in the form of improved 
seeds, fertilizers, and postharvest technologies like 
grain storage systems to farmers through collateral 
arrangements with local governments. Some studies 
have shown that when weather conditions are 
uncertain, repayment requirements involve high 
risks for resource-poor households in Ethiopia. Bad 
harvests result in loan defaults, and farmers often 
face harsh penalties. Given these high risks, farmers 
prefer to keep input costs low. Indeed, a recent 
evaluation of the PADETS smallholder 
intensification program showed that only 22
percent used the complete package and that at the 
end of their participation in the project, only 8 
percent continued the use of improved seeds 
[Carlssona et al. 2005; Gebreselassie 2006],
Lack of access to finance is a key impediment to 
technology adoption. Short- and long-term finance 
remains scarce in the rural areas because the 
country lacks financial institutions that respond to 
the needs of the smallholder sector. The demand 
side also presents its own challenges. Small farmers 
lack collateral and have consumption needs that 
compete with resources that could be used for 
farm investments [Gebreselassie 2006],
Conflict has also exacerbated the effects of famine 
in Ethiopia, and the costs have been huge. The 
government's large expenditures on conflict have 
taken economic resources away from development 
efforts [von Braun et al. 1998], Debt repayments by 
the GOE have also put pressure on resources 
available for social development.
Population Pressure
Ethiopia's rapid population growth is also an 
important cause of famine. The current population 
growth rate is about 2.3 percent. Thirty-nine 
percent of the population lives below the national 
poverty line. Furthermore, 46 percent of the 
population is undernourished, and 47 percent of 
children under the age of five suffer from 
malnutrition. The return of Ethiopian refugees who 
fled to Sudan will also contribute to the population 
increase, especially in the rural areas [World Bank 
2007; UNDP 2006; CIA 2007],
Stakeholders
It is important to recognize the role played by key 
stakeholders in policy design and implementation. 
A stakeholder analysis provides an assessment of 
the interests and resources of key stakeholders for 
policy administration. It also helps determine how 
these interests and resources affect program 
outcomes [Crosby 1991], Table 1 identifies the key 
stakeholders that may be involved in famine 
mitigation and prevention in Ethiopia.
Table 1: Stakeholder Analysis o f  the Key Players in the M itigation and Prevention o f  Famine in  
Ethiopia
Stakeholder Role/Interest
Resource
Mobilization
Capacity
Degree of 
Involvement 
in the Issue
Small farmers Increased agricultural productivity and 
incomes
Low Primary
Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 
[EGTE]
Grain marketing and food policy Moderate Primary
Participatory Demonstration and 
Extension Training System 
[PADETS]
Smallholder intensification Moderate Primary
G O E  [such as Ministry of 
Agriculture and Ministry of 
Economic Development and 
Cooperation]
Agricultural development and food 
security
High Primary
Rural financial institutions Provision of credit High Primary
Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural 
Research [E1AR]
Agricultural research for development Moderate Primary
Universities [such as Alemaya 
University]
Agricultural education and research Moderate Secondary
international research institutes Food security, policy advice, plant 
science research, capacity strengthening
Moderate Primary
International donors Foreign assistance [food aid, debt relief, 
capacity strengthening]
High Primary
Policy Options
Because the causes of famine are multifaceted, 
multiple actions are required to prevent its 
occurrence. On a broader level, two points must be 
emphasized. First, specific programs alone cannot 
effectively tackle famine. Micro-level interventions 
should be considered in tandem with 
macroeconomic policies. Second, market integration 
and price stabilization must be in place for 
individual projects to function effectively. 
Questions of policy and program choice and 
sequencing arise in determining the optimal 
program mix for mitigating and preventing famine. 
The solution is to combine short- and long-term 
interventions [aid and development] in a mutually 
reinforcing manner [Webb and von Braun 1994;
von Braun et al. 1998]. The dimensions of time and 
relative impact of alternative polices and programs 
are shown in Figure 2.
The many causes of food vulnerability in Ethiopia 
that have been highlighted include rapid population 
growth; high rainfall variability leading to drought; 
land degradation and tenure constraints; inadequate 
access to inputs, credit, and extension; poor market 
structure and infrastructure; and policy-induced 
constraints. Strategies to improve food security and 
availability must address these issues. Some options 
to reduce food vulnerability are discussed here.
Figure 2: Patterns o f Time-Dependent Impacts o f Alternative Policies and Programs on Famine Mitigation 
and Prevention
Famine mitigation 
anti prevention*
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Source: von Braun et al. 1998.
Irrigation
Given that Ethiopia's irrigation potential has not 
been fully exploited and that small farmers in rural 
areas lack access to modern irrigation, irrigation 
development is necessary. Although not a panacea, 
irrigation projects that are managed by farmers can 
contribute significantly to food security by 
enhancing production and farmer incomes.
Integrated solutions must tackle the full scope of 
the problem. Thus, a viable small-scale irrigation 
project should include these seven basic 
requirements: [1] availability of suitable land, [2] 
availability of water resources, [3] availability of 
labor, [4] availability of non-irrigation production 
inputs, [5] access to markets, [6] capital resources,
and (7) appropriate water-lifting technology 
[Norman 1992; IFAD 2005],
Improved Access to Land, Technology, and 
Credit
Small farmers need secure property rights to make 
long-term investments in agriculture. Efficient 
allocation of land to alternative uses may be 
impractical if land markets are imperfect. Policy and 
administrative regulations that ensure the security 
of land tenure, as well as transparent and legal rules 
that facilitate open land transactions, are needed 
for the use of sustainable land management 
technologies. Small farmers also need access to 
credit for farm investments in areas like irrigation,
seeds, fertilizer, farm machinery, and postharvest 
processing technologies. The smallholder 
intensification programs in Ethiopia can be 
improved. Agricultural technologies should be 
properly tested for technical performance, cost- 
effectiveness or economic profitability, and 
sustainability. To ensure availability, emphasis 
should be given to creating incentives for adoption 
and making modern technologies affordable 
[Negatu 2005; Gebreselassie 2006], The private 
sector can also play a contributing role by 
administering outgrower schemes and participating 
in more market chain activities such as processing.
Market, Policy, and Institutional Reforms
The GOE needs to address the market constraints 
that small farmers face and invest more in road 
infrastructure. An improved road network can 
significantly reduce transaction costs. Additionally, 
since market risks are high, smallholders require 
institutionalized support for risk sharing and 
management [Gebreselassie 2006). Price
stabilization, forward contracting, and insurance are 
important steps to mitigate price risk.
Although public resources for famine mitigation 
and prevention are limited, increased resource 
mobilization is necessary for short-term 
interventions to contribute to long-term efforts. In 
the short term, targeted feeding schemes and 
public works are helpful for income and food 
transfer during and after a famine. Proper 
management of food aid flows, particularly timely 
and efficient distribution of food assistance, is 
crucial [von Braun et al. 1998],
The role of the international donor community will 
remain critical to famine mitigation and prevention. 
International capacity must be strengthened to 
provide the assistance needed to those most 
vulnerable to famine [von Braun et al. 1998], Debt 
forgiveness such as the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries [HIPC] initiative will also play an 
important role. Savings in debt service as a result of 
the assistance can free up resources for safety net 
programs.
Research and Extension
Research and development [RstD] efforts can help 
to identify appropriate water-lifting technology for
irrigation. Investment in drought-resistant and 
high-yield crops can boost production. Proper 
dissemination of production and market 
information by extension agents is also essential. 
Since research and extension activities require 
adequate resources, collaboration with international 
institutes is helpful.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend a set of short- 
and long-term policies and programs to improve 
food security in Ethiopia that will be compatible 
with available government resources and reductions 
of Ethiopia's dependence on foreign food aid.
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